Erm...no? 
I can't make this point any more clearly, Kühlmann was on the same page as OHL, Wilhelm II, Michaelis, and all the rest when it came to the concessions in Belgium. The decision to make the offer was agreed upon at a Crown Council in Bellevue on September 11th, 1917, presided over by the Kaiser himself. [1] These Crown Councils were where the most important decisions in the Reich were made - decisions like choosing to escalate the July Crisis into war, to start and end the first phase of USW, and to initiate the Battle of Verdun. Nothing said in these meetings would have been so trivially dismissed or reneged on without archival records noting it down. At Bellevue, the overall mood was more conciliatory than might have been expected, with Wilhelm II saying that the Flanders coastline should not interfere with a "decent peace", while Michaelis as Chancellor was also more moderate than Bethmann-Hollweg had been by not pressing for the annexation of Briey-Longwy. [2] For a man usually portrayed as the puppet of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, this was rather pacifistic of Michaelis, and indicates to me that the general atmosphere of the Bellevue Crown Council was far from the caricature of jackboot Prussians who only wanted conquest and never negotiated except as a form of trickery.
[1] Stevenson, "Failure of Peace," 80.
[2] Stevenson, "Failure of Peace," 81.
I can't make this point any more clearly, Kühlmann was on the same page as OHL, Wilhelm II, Michaelis, and all the rest when it came to the concessions in Belgium. The decision to make the offer was agreed upon at a Crown Council in Bellevue on September 11th, 1917, presided over by the Kaiser himself. [1] These Crown Councils were where the most important decisions in the Reich were made - decisions like choosing to escalate the July Crisis into war, to start and end the first phase of USW, and to initiate the Battle of Verdun. Nothing said in these meetings would have been so trivially dismissed or reneged on without archival records noting it down. At Bellevue, the overall mood was more conciliatory than might have been expected, with Wilhelm II saying that the Flanders coastline should not interfere with a "decent peace", while Michaelis as Chancellor was also more moderate than Bethmann-Hollweg had been by not pressing for the annexation of Briey-Longwy. [2] For a man usually portrayed as the puppet of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, this was rather pacifistic of Michaelis, and indicates to me that the general atmosphere of the Bellevue Crown Council was far from the caricature of jackboot Prussians who only wanted conquest and never negotiated except as a form of trickery.[1] Stevenson, "Failure of Peace," 80.
[2] Stevenson, "Failure of Peace," 81.
Sure. Marquess Lansdowne published a letter on November 29th, 1917 that called for concretely defining what objectives Britain was actually fighting for in the war. Although this doesn't seem like much, clarifying Britain's conditions for peace was a necessary first step to any negotiation, and in the context of a government that had made it a point of official policy to stay mum on precise war aims so as to kick that unpleasant ball down the road, this demand to put forth an actual, public peace programme was hugely provocative! Business circles and some press like the Manchester Guardian supported the Lansdowne Letter, [3] but more importantly, so did the Labour Party and Trade Unions badly hurt by a lack of manpower at home due to conscription. And while Lansdowne got blasted by Lloyd George, Balfour, and other British political elites for his letter in public, privately they said only that he should have kept his opinions to himself during wartime - without overt disagreement. No less a personage than former PM Asquith sided with Lansdowne in "complete concurrence". [4] Earlier in the year, Labour member Arthur Henderson wanted Britain to participate at the Stockholm Conference, where socialists from the Second International met to discuss a potential peace. There was also E. D. Morel, leader of the Union of Democratic Control, who represented pacifist sentiments in Britain. And finally, inside Lloyd George's Cabinet, Viscount Milner was supportive of a compromise with Germany, pushing Lloyd George to establish minimal war aims (hence echoing Lansdowne) and open a dialogue to the enemy as long as Britain's allies were consulted. [5]
A diverse cast who hailed from Conservative, Labour, Liberal and Trade Union backgrounds. I do not claim that these members constituted a coherent political faction or that they demanded peace at any cost. However, I do assert that voices for peace existed in OTL 1917, that they represented a non-negligible portion of the British populace, and that in the event of public peace negotiations which made the return of Belgium without further war a real possibility, these voices would have gotten louder and stronger. According to Fest, a "considerable part of the population" found Lansdowne's letter appealing, [6] while Brock presents contemporary press analysis which lends credence to this statement. [7] These are factors that cannot be ignored.
[3] Fest, "Failure of Peace," 303.
[4] Brock, "Counsel of Despair", 246.A diverse cast who hailed from Conservative, Labour, Liberal and Trade Union backgrounds. I do not claim that these members constituted a coherent political faction or that they demanded peace at any cost. However, I do assert that voices for peace existed in OTL 1917, that they represented a non-negligible portion of the British populace, and that in the event of public peace negotiations which made the return of Belgium without further war a real possibility, these voices would have gotten louder and stronger. According to Fest, a "considerable part of the population" found Lansdowne's letter appealing, [6] while Brock presents contemporary press analysis which lends credence to this statement. [7] These are factors that cannot be ignored.
[3] Fest, "Failure of Peace," 303.
[5] Fest, "Failure of Peace," 304.
[6] Fest, "Failure of Peace," 303.
[7] Brock, "Counsel of Despair, 246.
So that I'm not always drawing on the same articles, I found another which also discussed the British outlook on the war by late 1917/early 1918:
- Millman, Brock. “A Counsel of Despair: British Strategy and War Aims, 1917-18.” Journal of Contemporary History 36, no. 2 (2001): 241–70. http://www.jstor.org/stable/261225.
I've never said that democracies in general or the British in particular were weak-willed, so please don't put words in my mouth. However, Britain being exhausted by the end of WWI is a well documented historical fact, especially since British leaders in late 1917 did not have our modern hindsight that Germany were even closer to collapse than the Entente were, in spite of their victories over Romania and Russia, due to the effects of the Royal Navy's blockade. Multiple historians attest to this, for example Victor Rothwell...
From Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, pgs. 162-3.
...and John Turner, who states that Britain's attitude in the later years of the Great War was akin to a country "under the shadow of defeat." [8]
As for disillusionment with the Great War being a product of 1930s revisionism, I checked the footnotes as well as citations in the articles I've used, and their sources were taken from cabinet minutes, personal papers, and private diaries written in the days right after said events happened, during the conflict itself. When Lloyd George, Painlevé, Kühlmann, et al. were seriously considering peace, they were doing so in the heat of the moment, not in self-aggrandizing memoirs or blame-shifting apologia written decades after the fact.
Since this is alternate history, we cannot conclusively prove that segments of the British public would’ve been swayed by Kühlmann's Peace Kite (a stance which seems needlessly skeptical of the Cabinet’s own position on the matter). However, the fear of said possibility was real, and would have influenced decisions made by British political elites under the assumption that peace was popular. Even if the German offer was nothing but mischief, it would not have been kept secret if it did not have potential to stir up trouble.
Lastly, we can also look at what the British military thought of Kühlmann's offer. By OTL January 1918, Haig was in favour of a compromise peace because the Empire was reaching its limit and prolonged warfare would only be to America's advantage. [9] Haig was supported by Smuts, and together they advanced a trade of German colonies for freedom to act against Russia. We know that the Marshal was hardly a figure for appeasement, or giving the Germans any more than the bare minimum, or, for that matter, agreeing with Lloyd George on anything; as the war's strongest proponent of a Western Front-first strategy, Haig could not be accused of being soft or weak either. This point is made all the more poignant because Haig changed his mind from his initial rejection in September 1917 of any compromise that abandoned Russia, [10] which suggests that his convictions were about as genuine as possible and based on what information was available to him. Haig didn't have some peacenik narrative he was always striving towards or working backwards to create, these sentiments were written in letters as they happened that were then used as primary documents in the articles I cited. Meanwhile, Robertson was already nowhere near as confident as Haig when interviewed by Lloyd George at the same time. One cannot possibly suggest that, somehow, all these men were lying, retroactively inflating German strength, or deliberately downplaying Britain's will to fight. This was what the British decision-makers thought of their odds in the war in late 1917. They did not know, as we do now, that Germany was running on fumes. If Kühlmann talked, they would have listened.
[8] Turner, British Politics and the Great War, 1.
[9] Fest, "Failure of Peace," 306.
[10] Woodward, "Brass Hats," 64.
As for disillusionment with the Great War being a product of 1930s revisionism, I checked the footnotes as well as citations in the articles I've used, and their sources were taken from cabinet minutes, personal papers, and private diaries written in the days right after said events happened, during the conflict itself. When Lloyd George, Painlevé, Kühlmann, et al. were seriously considering peace, they were doing so in the heat of the moment, not in self-aggrandizing memoirs or blame-shifting apologia written decades after the fact.
Since this is alternate history, we cannot conclusively prove that segments of the British public would’ve been swayed by Kühlmann's Peace Kite (a stance which seems needlessly skeptical of the Cabinet’s own position on the matter). However, the fear of said possibility was real, and would have influenced decisions made by British political elites under the assumption that peace was popular. Even if the German offer was nothing but mischief, it would not have been kept secret if it did not have potential to stir up trouble.
Lastly, we can also look at what the British military thought of Kühlmann's offer. By OTL January 1918, Haig was in favour of a compromise peace because the Empire was reaching its limit and prolonged warfare would only be to America's advantage. [9] Haig was supported by Smuts, and together they advanced a trade of German colonies for freedom to act against Russia. We know that the Marshal was hardly a figure for appeasement, or giving the Germans any more than the bare minimum, or, for that matter, agreeing with Lloyd George on anything; as the war's strongest proponent of a Western Front-first strategy, Haig could not be accused of being soft or weak either. This point is made all the more poignant because Haig changed his mind from his initial rejection in September 1917 of any compromise that abandoned Russia, [10] which suggests that his convictions were about as genuine as possible and based on what information was available to him. Haig didn't have some peacenik narrative he was always striving towards or working backwards to create, these sentiments were written in letters as they happened that were then used as primary documents in the articles I cited. Meanwhile, Robertson was already nowhere near as confident as Haig when interviewed by Lloyd George at the same time. One cannot possibly suggest that, somehow, all these men were lying, retroactively inflating German strength, or deliberately downplaying Britain's will to fight. This was what the British decision-makers thought of their odds in the war in late 1917. They did not know, as we do now, that Germany was running on fumes. If Kühlmann talked, they would have listened.
[8] Turner, British Politics and the Great War, 1.
[9] Fest, "Failure of Peace," 306.
[10] Woodward, "Brass Hats," 64.
Thank you, I try my best!
The Bellevue Crown Council was very explicit on what was being offered: Belgian independence and no naval bases for the High Seas Fleet on the Flanders coastlines. The scholars I've read have varying opinions on how truthful Kühlmann was - Woodward leans in favour, [11] Fest against [12] - and its certainly possible that everything he said was a lie and the extant records we have of his words and actions are deceptive, but...it is also entirely possible that they were meant in good faith? Source criticism is warranted, but trying to read the minds of people who lived and died almost a century ago is a futile exercise, one that is too easily clouded by our own personal biases, IMO. Going off purely what the evidence says, a German peace offer that included the restoration of Belgium as one of its terms factually occurred. The ATL only asks what if it was picked up by the British.
[11] Woodward, "Kühlmann Peace Kite", 93.
[12] Fest, "War Aims and Peace Feelers", 303.
Also, we have an actual example of what Germany's attempt at diplomatic subterfuge disguised as a peace offer looks like - their response to Wilson's call for both the Entente and Central Powers to present terms in December of 1916. Bethmann-Hollweg's reply was loud, vague, and a piece of showmanship meant only for public consumption. Kühlmann's secretive approach if anything lends weight to his intentions being sincere, as the Sixtus Affair was. Any real peace process would necessarily have been a delicate exercise due to the sheer number of conflicting interests on both sides, so establishing a secure channel to talk without the world knowing was a reasonable step to take. Before Wilson's Fourteen Points, secret diplomacy was the norm.
[11] Woodward, "Kühlmann Peace Kite", 93.
[12] Fest, "War Aims and Peace Feelers", 303.
Also, we have an actual example of what Germany's attempt at diplomatic subterfuge disguised as a peace offer looks like - their response to Wilson's call for both the Entente and Central Powers to present terms in December of 1916. Bethmann-Hollweg's reply was loud, vague, and a piece of showmanship meant only for public consumption. Kühlmann's secretive approach if anything lends weight to his intentions being sincere, as the Sixtus Affair was. Any real peace process would necessarily have been a delicate exercise due to the sheer number of conflicting interests on both sides, so establishing a secure channel to talk without the world knowing was a reasonable step to take. Before Wilson's Fourteen Points, secret diplomacy was the norm.
I mentioned July 1917 as part of the background context for my TLDR point form timeline, but said timeline also notes that the POD would be in September, after the Kornilov Affair had all but made the October Revolution an inevitability. Since the initial butterflies would be constrained to secret diplomacy and maybe some different speeches in the Reichstag, Parliament, and Chamber of Deputies, its improbable that the internal situation in Russia would change so drastically that Kerensky could somehow manage to find untapped reserves of personal authority, military strength, or political capital that he hadn't squandered away in his namesake Offensive and the July Days. Lenin was going to come to power one way or another, and IOTL he had a very difficult time convincing not just the SRs, Mensheviks, and other revolutionaries to make peace, but his own Bolshevik Party; Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, and Trotsky among others were all reluctant to negotiate with the Germans, and it took Operation Faustschlag to hammer home the fact that Red Russia was in no position to resist Brest-Litvosk's demands.
As outlined above, Lloyd George and Haig were willing to concede Courland and Lithuania to Germany if it meant an independent Belgium, and I believe that Kühlmann would have agreed to these terms as part of the final treaty's ratification. In fact, the initial draft of Brest-Litovsk did not annex any more territory than this! However, once the Bolsheviks refuse to sign, as they did OTL (and which resulted in the stipulations becoming harsher, i.e. in regards to Ukraine), how could the Germans be blamed for finishing off the communists? And with the ink on the western peace treaty barely dry, as well as the common soldiers riding high on the euphoria of the war ending, the Entente would not be in a position to abruptly declare "actually, never mind, the war is back on and you're returning to the trenches because the Bolsheviks didn't know when to quit". I could see Britain and France launching their OTL intervention in Murmansk, and there may perhaps be a proxy war between pro-German and pro-Entente Russian factions, but its not as though Kühlmann would have demanded the annexation of Crimea to Lloyd George's face. It would have been a development that neither could have foreseen in TTL December 1917, which nonetheless would result in Germany managing to acquire more territory in the east.
As outlined above, Lloyd George and Haig were willing to concede Courland and Lithuania to Germany if it meant an independent Belgium, and I believe that Kühlmann would have agreed to these terms as part of the final treaty's ratification. In fact, the initial draft of Brest-Litovsk did not annex any more territory than this! However, once the Bolsheviks refuse to sign, as they did OTL (and which resulted in the stipulations becoming harsher, i.e. in regards to Ukraine), how could the Germans be blamed for finishing off the communists? And with the ink on the western peace treaty barely dry, as well as the common soldiers riding high on the euphoria of the war ending, the Entente would not be in a position to abruptly declare "actually, never mind, the war is back on and you're returning to the trenches because the Bolsheviks didn't know when to quit". I could see Britain and France launching their OTL intervention in Murmansk, and there may perhaps be a proxy war between pro-German and pro-Entente Russian factions, but its not as though Kühlmann would have demanded the annexation of Crimea to Lloyd George's face. It would have been a development that neither could have foreseen in TTL December 1917, which nonetheless would result in Germany managing to acquire more territory in the east.
Haven't you heard?
The Germans, never, ever, ever would have done that.
They didn't have the occupation troops to sustain it.
The Russians were failing on their own.
The Germans had plenty of better things to do with their forces.
The Germans had *no reason* to do it. The Russians had endless space to retreat after Petrograd. Thus by ironclad logic, they never would have.
[OOC: I'm play-acting with you, but that's a summary of the response I got when I posted: https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...-and-navally-seized-petrograd-in-1917.490252/ ]
Well, I think that's a lazy and deterministic approach to alternate history. And a hypothetical occupation of Petrograd would have immense consequences for Lenin and the Bolsheviks, to say the least; IOTL, Trotsky did not fight so hard to defend the "cradle of the Revolution" [13] against Yudenich's advance in 1919 for no reason! The communists could and likely would regroup in Moscow, and I haven't come across German plans to march that deep into Russia (points for rare OHL sanity moment?), but whether Lenin's clique specifically would survive his unpopular and failed strategy of collaboration with Germany is much more doubtful. And if the Reds fall into infighting as a result of Petrograd and Kronstadt being lost, that only leaves them vulnerable to Kolchak's Whites and Czechoslovaks (I wonder what happens to them if Austria-Hungary isn't falling to pieces?) coming west along the Trans-Siberian Railway. ITTL, the Moscow Directive could very well succeed, and Kolchak would become Supreme Ruler of Russia in fact as well as name. Then the Admiral has to actually lead his country.
[13] A description I borrowed from Herwig, "Anti-Bolshevik Crusade", 349.
[13] A description I borrowed from Herwig, "Anti-Bolshevik Crusade", 349.
I did not consider this angle before, good catch! If Mannerheim plays it smart, he could try to discreetly win favour with Britain and France - the likes of Churchill and Fisher would no doubt love to pry Scandinavia from the German sphere of influence. The difficulty lies in how to separate Finland from being seen as a mere extension of the Central Powers. Should Kolchak "win" the Russian Civil War as I outlined above, though, I think it would be his government that receives the lion's share of British support. It would be very easy for the Entente to promise to return to Russia all the separatist countries that broke free under Germany's aegis in exchange for keeping the Central Powers sandwiched between two fronts. I'm not a big believer in the idea that WWII was inevitable or France/Russia would take OTL Germany's place, but alliance blocs have been a thing since nations states were a thing, and realpolitik waits for no one.
